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 Protecting Minority Shareholders: Listed versus Unlisted Firms 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper compares listed and unlisted Swiss firms and asks whether listed firms 
structure their corporate governance to better protect minority shareholders and raise 
funds from the capital markets.  In our comparison, we examine disclosure policies and 
study board-related characteristics such as nominating authority, tasks, composition, 
term, meeting frequency, and compensation.1  We also ask whether listed firms actually 
do more for their shareholders.  
According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), the problem of 
minority protection is fairly acute in countries outside the United States, since firms in 
those countries are often controlled by blockholders.  In Switzerland, not surprisingly, 
protecting minority investors has been the main motivation driving the corporate 
governance discussion and the revisions of corporate legislation during the past fifteen 
years.  This paper asks whether listed firms care more for shareholders at large than 
unlisted firms do.   
Our investigation is ultimately related to the decision to go public.  In making that 
decision, the controlling shareholders compare marginal benefits and costs.  The marginal 
benefits include the opportunity to dispose of shares in a more liquid market, the ability 
for shareholders to diversify risk [Bodnaruk, Kandel, Massa, and Simonov (2006)], gains 
                                                 
1  Listed firms that wish to raise capital can further protect minority shareholders by cross-listing on 
exchanges that subject them to stricter securities laws [Stulz (1999), Pagano, Röell, and Zechner 
(2002), and Reese and Weisbach (2001)].   
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from market timing [Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998)], and a lower cost of capital.2  
They also include the ability to tap new sources of capital [Kim and Weisbach (2005)], 
reputational advantages [Brau and Fawcett (2006)], and increased flexibility in designing 
performance-based compensation [Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz (2001)].  The 
marginal costs include giving up private benefits of control [Zingales (1995) and 
Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig (2005)] and the cost of listing.3   
Whatever they might be, the benefits of going public hinge on being able to raise 
money in the public markets at the time of the IPO and of subsequent rounds of financing 
[Kim and Weisbach (2005)].  Consequently, it would seem that listed firms have to find 
ways to attract minority shareholders [see Jensen and Meckling (1976) and, among 
others, Baker and Gompers (2003)].  Presumably, that requires giving them better 
protection than that available while the company is privately held.  
Our study should contribute to the literature in three ways.  First, we focus on several 
board characteristics at the same time and investigate whether the corporate governance 
package of listed firms differs from that of unlisted firms  [for a survey that reviews 
board characteristics, see, among others, John and Senbet (1998), and Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003)].  Second, we examine unlisted firms.  We know fairly little about these 
                                                 
2  For example, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) document that independent companies experience 
a reduction in the cost of bank credit after the IPO, possibly because of the improved information or 
the stronger bargaining position.   
3  There is disagreement, however, about whether going public increases managerial discretion and 
whether that has adverse effects.  Bhide (1993) argues that liquid markets impede control and thereby 
induce (or exacerbate) conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers.  In contrast, 
according to Maug (1998), liquid markets favor monitoring by enabling investors to more cheaply 
compile significant blocks of votes.  Boot, Gopalan, and Thakor (2003) and Boot, Gopalan, and 
Thakor (2006) think the same way, but contend that, in a world of asymmetric information and 
unpredictable investor bases, the accumulation of voting blocks to reign in managers can be 
detrimental.  Increased outside control can also discourage valuable firm-specific investments by 
managers [Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997)], or managerial effort [Adams (2001)]. 
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firms [Zingales (2000)],4 let alone about their boards [Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)].  
And third, by relying on a survey of chairmen of the board (COBs), we are able to ask 
direct questions that would be difficult to answer with conventional data.  
Investigating corporate Switzerland is not necessarily a restriction.  Swiss equity 
market capitalization is the tenth largest in the world, and the fifth largest in Europe.  Our 
sample includes global players such as ABB, Credit Suisse, Novartis, Roche, Syngenta, 
and UBS.  Switzerland is also an interesting case because of its institutions.  Swiss legal 
guidelines are fairly tolerant in matters related to corporate governance, which means that 
many of the governance measures firms adopt are voluntary and not imposed by law or 
regulation.  
The evidence we uncover is generally consistent with the hypothesis that listed firms 
seem to be concerned about minority shareholders and that they address that problem 
with larger doses and a different mix of remedies.  Unlike what we observe in unlisted 
firms, their boards own typically very little stock, which could protect minority 
shareholders from being expropriated by controlling shareholders.  Moreover, they 
disclose more and better even when not required to, and they opt for board design, 
composition, processes, and incentives that are consistent with the need to give minority 
shareholders more protection.  The boards of unlisted firms are different in this regard, 
but they are in no way without real function.  The evidence also suggests that listed firms 
perform better, at least as measured by their industry-adjusted sales growth.  Finally, 
listed firms seem to put their money where their mouth is and distribute more cash to 
shareholders at large.  The latter evidence, however, is tentative and needs to be 
buttressed further.           
                                                 
4  The literature, however, has begun closing this gap.  See, for example, Cole and Mehran (2006). 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents the 
investigation design in more detail.  Section 3 discusses the data and their source.  
Section 4 examines the ownership structure of listed and unlisted firms.  Section 5 
compares the disclosure practices of those firms.  Section 6 contrasts board architecture 
and processes.  Section 7 investigates those differences in more detail.  Section 8 inquires 
into the adoption of anti-takeover defenses.  Section 9 examines differential firm 
performance, and Section 10 draws conclusions. 
 
2. Methodology 
Since unlisted firms do not depend much on the equity markets, they have few incentives 
to disclose any information—and there is little they have to disclose under Swiss law.  In 
addition, their boards might simply be there because the law prescribes their existence.     
In contrast, listed firms have different incentives.  If they want to raise money from 
the general public on favorable terms, they have to attract investors [Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)].  They have to solve a governance problem, namely the protection of minority 
investors, which unlisted firms do not face, or do so in a less extreme form.  That means: 
(a) becoming more transparent; (b) choosing board structures and designing board 
processes that make it difficult for controlling shareholders to expropriate their fellow 
shareholders; and (c) providing managers and directors with the appropriate incentives.  
The purpose of this paper is to test these predictions.  We also test whether listed firms 
have indeed a more diffuse ownership structure, and whether they perform better and 
distribute more cash to shareholders.       
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In principle, we should compare firms before listing and right afterward.  
Unfortunately, we only have data about a cross-section of listed and unlisted firms, and 
little information about the listed firms when they go public.  Hence, we conduct a cross-
sectional comparison of listed and unlisted firms.5  In a paper with a similar purpose, 
Gertner and Kaplan (1996) examine the board structure of firms that undergo a reverse 
leveraged buyout.  For comparable reasons, however, they investigate the years 
immediately after the IPO.  Baker and Gompers (2003) perform a study of the boards of 
firms that go public.  Still, they do not compare pre- and post-IPO board characteristics, 
but rather board characteristics of venture- and nonventure-capital-backed IPO firms.  
One potential difficulty in carrying out our investigation arises because many of the 
dimensions of corporate governance we are interested in could be the result of deliberate 
optimization and therefore be interdependent.6  The problem is, we do not know of any 
paper that formally models the result of such an optimization [see also Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2006)].  What we can do, however, is focus on the reduced form of such 
hypothetical models, and examine whether being listed affects the equilibrium 
characteristics of interest, such as ownership structure or board independence.  What 
follows explains in the necessary detail the design of our investigation.   
Formally, suppose there are M structural equations and M endogenous variables, 
represented by the vector ty , that describe the optimal structure and processes of 
corporate governance.  Also, suppose there are K exogenous variables with an influence 
                                                 
5  All unlisted firms in our sample would meet the listing requirements of the Swiss Stock Exchange’s 
local segment. 
6  See also Hermalin and Weisbach (2003).  
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on corporate governance, as summarized by the vector tx .  The structural form of the 
model is 
' ' '
t t ty x BΓ + = ε , 
where Γ and B are parameter matrices, and tε is a vector of uncorrelated disturbances 
randomly drawn from an M-variate distribution with zero expected values and finite 
variance-covariance matrix [Greene (2000, pp. 658-660)].  Assuming Γ is nonsingular, 
we can write the reduced form of the model as  
' ' 1 ' 1 ' '
t t t t ty x B x v
− −= − Γ + ε Γ = Π +  . (1) 
As pointed out above, we are unable to estimate the structural coefficients Γ and B of 
the model.  We can, however, examine whether various dimensions of corporate 
governance in listed firms differ from those we observe in unlisted firms.  This means 
comparing the left-hand side of the reduced form (1) of the corporate governance model 
in listed firms with that in unlisted firms.  We can do so without being concerned about 
the fact that the corporate governance dimensions we study are interdependent.  In doing 
so, we assume the listing decision as given.  We investigate various internal governance 
mechanisms― ownership structure and board architecture and processes.  This first step 
of the analysis can be carried out with a series of mean (median) comparison tests.   
Finding a difference between listed and unlisted firms could be induced by different 
reduced-form parameter coefficients, Π, or because the sample averages of the exogenous 
variables in the model differ across firms―listed firms, for example, could be larger.  If 
the package of corporate governance provisions is different in listed firms, we would 
expect different coefficients, since the various governance instruments have to be 
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calibrated in a different way.  The second step of our analysis therefore investigates 
differences in the parameters Π.  For each governance dimension of interest, we therefore 
estimate the regression equations in (1) as follows: 
it 0i 1i 1t 2i 2t 0i i 1i 1t i 2i 2t i ity x x ... D x D x D ...v= π + π + π + + δ × + δ × + δ × + , (2) 
where Di is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed, and equal to 0 otherwise.  If 
corporate governance solutions differ in listed firms, at least some of the δi coefficients 
will be significantly different from zero.  Put differently, it is not enough to add the 
binary variable Di in equation (2) to assess the impact of listing.  We also have to allow 
for changes in the parameters associated with the exogenous variables.  Note that this 
analysis is also possible when the governance characteristics examined are not the result 
of deliberate optimization but the cumulative result of past events, such as the firm’s 
financing history [Baker and Gompers (2003)].           
Of course, the listing decision per se is endogenous at some point in the history of a 
corporation as well  [see, among others, Zingales (1995), Pagano and Röell (1998), Boot, 
Gopalan, and Thakor (2003, 2006a, 2006b)].  In our discussion, we have taken that 
decision as given.  However, in some cases, this potential endogeneity problem cannot be 
avoided completely, even if listing has occurred years in the past.  These are cases in 
which the governance variable of interest, for instance board independence, induces 
listing rather than (or in addition to) being affected by it.  In these cases, it is difficult to 
interpret the preceding tests and say something about causality.  To get around that 
problem, we replicate the analysis by instrumenting the binary variable Di.  We discuss 
the details of that procedure in more detail in the empirical section.     
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The second difficulty in testing our predictions is that listed firms have to do more 
about corporate governance by law or to meet the SWX Swiss Exchange’s (SWX) 
mandatory guidelines.  In and of itself, this does not contradict what we are saying, since 
law and exchange guidelines are ostensibly meant to protect minority investors.  Yet we 
cannot be sure.  The law could be there to protect incumbent firms against their young 
competitors.  If so, the type of governance firms adopt could be unrelated to the desire of 
attracting investors.  Our investigation therefore focuses on aspects of corporate 
governance that firms can adopt voluntarily.  
 
3. Sample Characteristics 
The data on board characteristics come from a survey conducted in 2003, when we sent a 
questionnaire to the COBs of the 1,102 largest firms headquartered in Switzerland.7  
Those firms included 176 companies listed on the SWX accounting for 97.8 percent of 
the exchange’s total market capitalization.  A total of 271 usable questionnaires were 
returned, for a response rate of roughly 25 percent.  The breakdown of the sample is 73 
SWX-listed firms (response rate of 41 percent, representing 66 percent of the exchange’s 
total market capitalization), 10 firms listed on foreign exchanges, 3 firms traded on the 
OTC market, and 185 unlisted firms (response rate of 21 percent).  The sample therefore 
includes 86 firms that we denote as listed, and 185 unlisted firms.  We also use data on 
disclosure practices.  We take these data from corporate Web sites and from the annual 
issues of Aktienführer der Schweiz, a publication of the biweekly newspaper Finanz und 
Wirtschaft.   
                                                 
7  This directory is from the publication “Top 2002 / Die grössten Unternehmen in der Schweiz,” 
printed by Handelszeitung, a business weekly.  
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Table I displays descriptive sample statistics.  Listed firms are a median 8 years 
younger than unlisted firms (49 years versus 57).  Moreover, they employ significantly 
more people—the median listed firm has almost 30 times as many employees as the 
median unlisted firm, namely, 8,000 versus 300.  The median listed firm is also much 
larger in terms of share capital—USD 38 million compared with USD 2 million, 
assuming an exchange rate of CHF 1.3 to the USD.  There are, however, fairly large 
firms among our unlisted firms as well—in fact, 21 percent of them employ more than 
1,000 people.  Table II provides the definition of all the independent variables used in the 
analysis. 8 
 
4. Ownership structure 
If the original shareholders give up some control with the IPO to raise outside capital, 
listed firms should be less closely held.  Moreover, if these shareholders want to bond 
themselves and signal that they intend to refrain from the temptation to reap private 
benefits of control, they will sit less frequently on the board of their firms and be less 
frequently part of the management team.  In many respects, the ownership structure 
observed in listed firms follows a pattern that matches these predictions (Table III).  
The largest shareholder of a listed firm holds a median 24 percent of the votes in his 
firm, compared with the 70 percent he controls in unlisted firms.  Ownership structure in 
listed firms is less concentrated in general.  Aggregate blockholdings (defined as 
aggregate holdings of shareholders with a stake larger than 5 percent) make up a median 
45 percent of the votes in listed firms, compared with 100 percent in unlisted firms.  
Neither the largest shareholder nor blockholders in listed firms are generally managers or 
                                                 
8  A letter ‹b› in front of a given acronym identifies all binary variables in the analysis.   
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directors, since board and management control only a median 1.0 percent of the votes 
each.  The subsequent analysis reveals, however, that this tendency is inversely correlated 
with the largest shareholder’s stake.  Shareholders with a very large stake tend to be more 
often directors.  In unlisted firms, the largest shareholder is generally a board member,  
since directors as a group hold a median 75 percent of the votes, which is just about what 
the largest median shareholder controls.  However, the median holdings by managers are 
zero in unlisted firms as well.     
Even though their ownership structure is different, both types of firms confront 
similar potential conflicts of interest.  Since the largest shareholder does not typically 
control 100 percent of the votes in either firm, both listed and unlisted firms have 
minority shareholders and hence potential conflicts of interest between controlling and 
minority shareholders.  Moreover, since management owns little if any stock, both listed 
and unlisted firms face a potential separation of ownership and control problem [Berle 
and Means (1932)].  In listed firms, the problem could be exacerbated by the fact that the 
board owns little stock, too. 
5. Disclosure 
Listed firms are required by law and the SWX guidelines to make various pieces of 
information publicly available, including their financial statements.  In comparison, 
unlisted firms are not required to disclose much of anything.  Corporate law asks them to 
file with the commercial register only: (a) name, place, and date of incorporation; (b) 
purpose; (c) corporate charter; (d) number of shares outstanding, par value, and 
restrictions on transferability of shares; and (e) names of directors.  Since they do not 
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want to attract investors at large, unlisted firms might choose to reveal as little 
information as possible.  Doing otherwise would be costly and help competitors.  
Comparing the disclosure policy of listed and unlisted firms can be a problem, 
however, because it may be difficult to assess what listed firms would have disclosed had 
they not been forced to do so by law.  To get around this problem, we focus on voluntary 
disclosure.  We first investigate the amount of information provided by the corporate 
Web sites of listed and unlisted firms.  Then we examine the accounting standards used 
by listed firms in the preparation of their financial statements.  We ask whether listed 
firms voluntarily release more information and choose more demanding standards than 
those required by law.       
 
5.1 COMPARISON OF CORPORATE WEB SITES 
Table IV shows the results of our analysis of corporate Web sites.  We expect listed firms 
to offer significantly more information.  According to Healy and Palepu (2001), issuing 
firms have similar incentives.  The results seem to bear out this prediction.  All listed 
firms and an overwhelming majority of the unlisted ones (91 percent) have corporate 
Web sites.  On them, unlisted firms provide only very scant financial information. Forty-
seven percent do not provide any such information, 15 percent disclose only last year’s 
sales, 12 percent provide data about sales or earnings during the past three years, and 
merely 25 percent publish full balance sheets or income statements.  In comparison, 
almost all listed firms (90 percent) post their full balance sheets and income statements.  
The difference is statistically significant.   
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Moreover, about 91 percent of all listed firms make the annual report available and 57 
percent display their organizational chart.  Significantly fewer unlisted firms do so.  
Barely 25 percent include their annual reports and fewer yet show their organizational 
charts.   
Listed firms therefore reveal more, consistent with the contention that they want to be 
more transparent.  One could argue that, since unlisted firms are smaller, they also have 
fewer resources to spend.  The problem with this argument is that, if a company has a 
Web site (which most unlisted firms do), the marginal costs of posting items such as a 
balance sheet or an organizational chart are negligible.  Moreover, in multivariate logit 
regressions of whether or not firms make a particular item available on their corporate 
Web sites, listing status has a positive and significant coefficient even after controlling 
for firm capitalization (not shown).   
 
5.2 ACCOUNTING STANDARDS  
In 2002, the SWX decided that, starting with fiscal year 2005, listed firms would have to 
use internationally accepted standards in the presentation of their financial statements.9  
Until then, firms could choose among IFRS, US GAAP, or Swiss GAAP FER.  
Compared with internationally accepted standards, Swiss GAAP FER is more ambiguous 
and makes cross-sectional comparisons more difficult [see also Dumontier and 
Raffournier (1998)].  In terms of sheer costs, however, it is the most convenient standard.  
Yet, even before the SWX decision, the majority of listed firms used IFRS or US GAAP.  
                                                 
9  Actually, the requirement applies to firms listed in the main segment.  Local caps, real estate 
companies, and investment companies can use other standards.  There are only two such firms in the 
sample.     
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This confirms the hypothesis that listed firms want to disclose more information to 
investors. 
To document this claim, the following table inquires what accounting standards were 
used by firms traded on the SWX in 2001, the year before the exchange introduced the 
new regulation.  
 
Accounting standards  2001 
IFRS 154  (52.0%) 
US GAAP 14  (4.7%) 
Swiss GAAP FER 97  (32.8%) 
Bank-specific regulatory standards  20  (6.8%) 
SWX-specific standards 3  (1.0%) 
Other 8  (2.7%) 
  
Total 296 (100.0%) 
   
 
Of the 296 firms that traded on the SWX in 2001, 154 used IFRS, 14 used US GAAP, 
and only 97 used Swiss GAAP FER.  Excluding banks and other special cases that have 
their own regulation, 63 percent10 of all listed firms therefore adhered to stricter standards 
than those required by law.  Some of these firms were traded on foreign exchanges and 
were therefore forced to adopt IFRS (31 firms) or US GAAP (7 firms).  Even taking these 
cases into account, however, 57 percent11 of the companies listed on the SWX that were 
free to choose adopted standards that improve comparability.  This corroborates the 
hypothesis that listed firms want to be more transparent and therefore more attractive to 
investors at large.  Consistent with this evidence, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find that a 
                                                 
10  (154+14)/(154+14+97) = 0.63. 
11  (154–31+14–7)/( 154–31+14–7+97) = 0.57. 
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group of firms that switch from German GAAP to IAS or US-GAAP, and thereby 
commit to increased levels of disclosure, experience lower bid-ask spreads. 
Overall, the evidence presented in this section supports the claim that listed firms 
disclose more and better.  In the following section, we ask whether they also structure 
their board to attract minority investors. 
    
6. Board Architecture and Processes  
Boards have an important role of protecting minority shareholders [Anderson and Reeb 
(2004)].  However, there are hardly any provisions in Swiss corporate law or in the 
SWX’s regulations concerning board structure.  Corporate law, in particular, only says 
that the majority of directors have to be Swiss citizens, that all directors must own at least 
one share of stock, and that boards must have at least one member (three at the time of 
incorporation).  Other than the law, only the Swiss Code of Best Practice (SCBP) 
addresses board-related matters, but its recommendations concerning board independence 
and the appointment of board committees are vague and non-binding.  The code is issued 
by Economiesuisse, the largest private umbrella organization of Swiss businesses from all 
sectors of the economy.  Unlike what happens in the U.K., firms that do not comply with 
the code do not even have to explain why.  
We can therefore test whether the boards of listed firms are designed to give minority 
shareholders better protection.  We begin with a discussion of board architecture.  Section 
6.2 examines the board’s nominating authority.  Section 6.3 reviews board processes, 
tasks, and incentives.     
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6.1 BOARD ARCHITECTURE  
To be effective, listed firms have to find appropriate board structures.  Panel A of the 
table examines size, independence, committee structure, the presence of blockholders on 
the board, as well as COB-CEO duality.  The results are in Panel A of Table V.   
6.1.1 Board Size  
Being a publicly traded company would seem to complicate board activities because 
the firm has to interact with capital markets.  Among other things, listed firms have 
compliance issues to deal with, they have to address delicate disclosure questions, and 
they have to protect minority investors.  This complexity requires more resources and, 
possibly, larger boards.  Of course, small boards have their advantages, too.  They would 
seem to be more efficient and to make it more difficult for directors to free ride [Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993)].12  The net effect is an empirical issue.  According 
to Jensen (1993), board effectiveness starts declining when board size exceeds 7-8 
directors.        
The data show that the boards of listed firms are significantly larger than those of 
unlisted firms, consistent with the hypothesis that listed firms face more complex issues.  
We find a median board size of 6 in listed firms and 5 in unlisted ones (the average 
numbers are 7 and 5, respectively).13  Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2004) report a median 
board size of 11 for the U.S., possibly because U.S. firms are larger.  We also asked 
COBs to indicate what board size would be optimal.  In both types of firms, actual 
average size corresponds to ideal size (not shown).  There are therefore reasons to believe 
                                                 
12  Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), find that smaller boards are associated 
with higher firm value.  See, however, also Bennedsen, Kongsted, and Nielsen (2006). 
13  For a comparison, Loderer and Peyer (2002) document a median board size in SWX firms of 9 in 
1980 and 7 in 1995.  Hence, board size in listed firms seems to have fallen over time.      
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that the various corporate governance dimensions we observe are equilibrium values.  It 
is therefore appropriate to think of them in terms of the simultaneous equations model 
discussed in Section 2.                
6.1.2 Board Independence 
To protect minority interests from the self-serving activities of majority shareholders and 
managers, the possible solution is to have a larger fraction of independent directors, 
defined as individuals without business ties to or a managerial job in the firm during the 
past three years [SCBP].14  Consistent with this prediction, the fraction of independent 
directors in listed firms is a median 80 percent, significantly larger than the 50 percent 
observed in unlisted firms.15  The proportion of listed firms with a fraction of independent 
directors larger than 50 percent is also significantly larger (89 versus 62 percent).    
6.1.3 Board Committees 
If the boards of listed firms have to take on more responsibilities, they should be 
structured to allow specialization.  The evidence confirms this prediction by showing that 
listed firms are more likely to have formal board committees.  The vast majority of listed 
firms have an audit and a nomination and compensation committee.  One should note, 
however, that most listed firms introduced board committees only in 2002 in reaction to 
the non-binding recommendations by the SCBP. 
                                                 
14  According to Bhagat and Black (1999), however, there is no clear relation between board 
independence and firm performance. 
15  In spite of the intense discussion in the media and the pressure by regulators, board independence in 
listed firms in Switzerland is still about where it was during the past fifteen years or so [Loderer and 
Peyer (2002)]. 
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6.1.4 Blockholder board representation 
In Table III, we documented that the largest shareholder sits less frequently on the board 
of listed firms.  The reason, we argued, could be the need to signal a credible 
commitment to limit his private benefits of control.  This empirical regularity holds for 
blockholders in general.  Sixty-one percent of listed firms have at least one blockholder 
on their board, compared with 72 percent in unlisted firms.  The difference is marginally 
significant (confidence 0.90) and persists if we exclude firms that do not have large 
shareholders. 
6.1.5 CEO-COB and CEO-director dualities 
The practice of CEO-COB duality is fairly controversial and differs significantly across 
countries [Dalton and Kesner (1987) and Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos (2002)].  
Whereas the media, shareholder activists, and regulators seem to believe that it is bad 
practice to have the same person serve as the CEO and the COB of a company, the 
evidence does not seem to bear this out [Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997)].   
We look for differences in duality between listed and unlisted firms in our sample.  If 
this phenomenon does indeed create agency problems, we would expect listed firms to be 
less frequently associated with this practice since they depend more on the capital 
markets.  According to the evidence, the fraction of firms with CEO-COB duality is 20 
percent in listed and 28 percent in unlisted firms; the difference, however, is statistically 
zero.  Hence, CEO-COB duality is reasonably diffused but unrelated to listing.  In 
comparison, 55 percent of listed firms in the U.S. had dual CEO-COBs (Lipton, 2007).  
We also investigate the case where the CEO is simultaneously a director (not necessarily 
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the COB).  This occurs in 40 percent of the listed firms and 51 percent of the unlisted 
ones.  This difference is not statistically significant either. 
Finding no difference in CEO-COB duality, however, does not necessarily mean that 
there are no problems associated with that practice.  In fact, when we look at listed firms 
with CEO-COB duality, we find that 73 percent have a lead director.  The percentage is 
only 37 in unlisted firms.  The difference is statistically significant.  According to Lipton 
(2007), appointing a lead director is what firms should do in case of duality.  This is also 
what the SCBP suggests.   
 
6.2 NOMINATING AUTHORITY 
We ask the COBs to tell us which parties have a say in the nomination of directors.  They 
can rate the influence of various parties on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being the weakest 
influence.  To guarantee separation of powers and cater to shareholders at large, listed 
firms should avoid giving nominating authority to management.  Also, to limit the 
consumption of private benefits of control, they should restrict blockholders’ ability to 
influence the composition of the board. 
Panel B of Table V compares the average nominating authority of various parties 
inside and outside the firm.  The first difference we notice is that the party with the 
greatest say in listed firms is the board, whereas in unlisted ones it is the blockholders.  
This is consistent with the claim that listed firms want to limit conflicts of interest and 
attract minority investors.  The result holds if we constrain our analysis to firms with 
blockholders.  Similarly, insiders such as the CEO and management have comparatively 
less nominating authority in listed firms, but the difference is not significant.  In either 
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type of firms, however, the CEO has less to say than the board or the blockholders.  
Separation of powers is therefore a principle practiced to some extent in all sample firms, 
regardless whether they are listed.  We also find that institutional investors carry more 
nominating weight in listed firms. 
 
6.3 BOARD PROCESSES, TASKS, AND INCENTIVES 
This section compares the functioning of boards, as well as the tasks that they are 
designed for.  In addition, we examine how directors are compensated.    
6.3.1 Meeting Frequency 
According to Vafeas (1999), board meeting frequency is an important dimension of board 
operations.  If board meetings have a real purpose, one would expect boards to meet more 
often in listed firms.  Panel C of Table V seems to support this contention.  Most listed 
firms (51 percent) meet between six and eight times a year,16 whereas 50 percent of the 
unlisted firms meet between three and five times. The difference is significant with 
confidence 0.99.  As a comparison, the table also reports the meeting frequencies that 
would be optimal in the eyes of the COB, based on their answer to a specific question in 
the survey.  Actual meeting frequencies is optimal regardless whether we examine listed 
or unlisted firms.  However, also COBs seem to think that boards should convene more 
frequently in listed than in unlisted firms.   
                                                 
16  Adams (2003) reports an average 7.6 regular board meetings in Fortune 500 firms. 
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6.3.2  Board Term   
Unless the corporate charter specifies otherwise, Swiss corporate law requires a term of 
three years;17 the legal maximum is six, and reelection possibilities are unrestricted.  One 
possible reason for limiting board terms is that changing markets require up-to-date skills 
and knowledge from board members.  Directors must therefore be replaceable.  The 
question is how long the terms should be.  Longer terms encourage directors to invest 
time and gain valuable firm-specific information.  However, longer terms can also lead to 
entrenchment.  Hence, we cannot predict what board term we should expect if listed firms 
wanted to protect minority investors.   
The evidence in Panel C of Table V reveals a board term of three years in 64 percent 
of the listed firms.  Three years is also the most common term in unlisted firms (46 
percent of the cases).  Yet there are many more cases of terms shorter than three years in 
unlisted firms (37 vs. 17 percent).  The difference is significant with 95-percent 
confidence. 
6.3.3  Board tasks 
According to the literature, the three main functions boards fulfill are advising managers 
about business strategy [see, among others, Fama and Jensen (1983)], monitoring 
managerial performance [see, among others, Fama (1980), Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998), Monks and Minow (2001), and Adams (2001)], and looking after the interests of 
stakeholders [Adams (2003)].   
In Section 4, we have seen that unlisted firms are closely held and that their 
blockholders are usually directors.  Even though the law puts boards formally in charge 
                                                 
17  There are discussions to bring that limit down to one year. 
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of strategy definition and monitoring, these blockholders will want to take over some of 
the functions that boards are in principle designed for.  If so, the boards of unlisted firms 
will tend to be more like rubber-stamp assemblies than effective organizations.18  In 
contrast, the boards of listed firms should have actual (as opposed to formal) 
responsibilities.  
To find out whether this is true, we ask the COBs in our sample to indicate the 
activities that their boards are responsible for and to specify the importance of those 
activities.  The activities range from strategy definition to company representation.  The 
results in Panel C of Table V indicate that the boards of listed firms are significantly 
more engaged in the appointment and dismissal of managers, the monitoring of the CEO, 
and in managing the relations with key investors.  There is no difference between the two 
sets of firms, however, when it comes to strategy definition and monitoring the firm’s 
financial situation.  An active supervision of the firm’s finances is not surprising, since 
directors are liable for delays in declaring bankruptcy regardless of whether the firm is 
listed.    
6.3.4 Board compensation 
Listing and the associated need to protect minority investors should also have an impact 
on the level as well as the composition of compensation package.  The level should be 
higher to make up for the increased media exposure that executives and directors have to 
endure.  Listed firms also tend to be confronted with a greater problem of separation of 
ownership and control.  To solve that problem, they may tie pay to performance—thereby 
                                                 
18  According to Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2003) this is also the case in listed firms with dispersed 
ownership.   
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introducing incentive mechanisms that replace the direct monitoring of the controlling 
shareholders.   
As it turns out, however, variable compensation does not seem to be the rule among 
directors, and there is no difference between listed and unlisted firms in this respect.  
Eighteen percent of listed firms pay their directors on a variable basis, compared with 14 
percent of unlisted firms (Panel C of Table V).  The difference is insignificant at 
customary levels. 
    
Overall, the boards of listed firms tend to differ from those of unlisted firms along the 
lines we would expect.  They are larger and more independent, they are structured more 
often with committees, meet more frequently, have shorter terms, and are more likely to 
have a lead director in the case of CEO-COB duality.  Moreover, nominating authority 
lies more often with the board itself and less often with blockholders.  There is no 
difference, however, with regard to variable compensation.  
    
7. The Mechanics of the Listing Effect 
This section wants to interpret the preceding evidence that various dimensions of 
corporate governance are not the same across listed and unlisted firms.  The question it 
seeks to answer is whether the governance model that is optimal for listed firms differs 
from that which is optimal for unlisted firms.  We can find out by examining whether the 
reduced form (1) of the model in listed firms has different coefficients than the one in 
unlisted firms.  Those coefficients are a function of the coefficients of the structural form 
of the model.  A difference in the coefficients would mean that the remedies in the 
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governance package of listed firms have different dosages and mixes.  In contrast, finding 
no difference in the coefficients of the reduced form would mean that the evidence we 
just reported of different governance dimensions is due to different means in the 
exogenous variables of the model.   
For simplicity, we estimate equation (2) only for a subset of the governance 
dimensions investigated in Table V.  We examine board size, independence, blockholder 
representation, variable compensation, as well as how intensely the board monitors the 
CEO and how deeply involved the board is in the nomination of new directors.  The 
regressions with a binary dependent variable are probit regressions, the rest are OLS 
regressions.  As a robustness test, we replicated the regression involving board size by 
measuring that variable as the relative deviation from the median board size of the firm’s 
industry.  The results are identical in terms of sign and significance of the coefficients.  
The independent variables are firm size (LNSIZE), the fraction of votes controlled by the 
largest shareholder (LARGESTVOTE), two binary variables that identify firms in the 
financial industry and the high-tech industry,19 respectively, and a binary variable that 
measures the firm’s listing status.  To allow for different doses of the remedies in the 
corporate governance package of listed and unlisted firms, each one of these variables is 
also included as an interaction variable with listing status.  Note that by selecting 
LARGESTVOTE as an exogenous variable, we assume that the stake of the largest 
shareholder is given.  We claim that it is corporate governance that accommodates to the 
largest shareholder rather than the other way around.  The results, however, remain 
                                                 
19  High-tech firms are in the chemical/pharmaceutical, medtech, technology/information systems, or the 
telecommunication industry. 
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unchanged when we drop that assumption and treat LARGESTVOTE as an endogenous 
variable.     
The results are shown in Table VI.  The coefficient of listing status has often 
significant coefficients either by itself or in conjunction with other exogenous variables.  
The results therefore suggest that the optimal corporate governance package of listed 
firms is different.  In part, firms meet their governance problems by simply adjusting the 
level of their governance tools, for example by choosing larger boards or opting for 
greater board independence.  This is what the significant coefficient of listing status alone 
suggests.  In part, however, they combine their various tools in a different way.  This is 
what the significant joint effects imply.  For the details, let’s take a look at the individual 
regressions and focus on the listing effect.   
Column (1) inquires into board size.  In general, the greater the stake controlled by 
the largest shareholder, the smaller the board, possibly because the controlling 
shareholder wants to run the firm from the board and has no need for many directors.  
However, this effect disappears when the firm is listed.  One explanation is that legal and 
regulation requirements make the board’s work in listed firms more complex.  Column 
(2) takes a look at board independence.  Listed firms have boards with a significantly 
larger proportion of outsiders, consistent with the hypothesis that listed firms want to 
separate powers and protect minority investors.  A high stake of the largest shareholder, 
however, offsets that tendency.  Presumably, majority shareholders with a big enough 
stake are more interested in securing their control than in providing guarantees to 
minority shareholders.  Column (3) refers to whether blockholders (in terms of the votes 
they control) are also directors.  We see that blockholders are generally less likely to sit 
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on the board of listed firms, unless they are the largest shareholder with a large stake, in 
which case they are more likely to be directors.  These results are significant with 
confidence 0.95.20  There is also an industry effect, in that the blockholders of listed 
financials are more frequently directors.  Board compensation is analyzed in column (4).  
The numbers reveal a difference between listed and unlisted firms that the mean-
comparison test of Table V fails to pick up.  There, we are unable to find any differences 
between listed and unlisted firms.  Here, we observe that listed firms in the financial 
industry are more likely to have variable forms of compensation.  In financials, the 
contribution of the board to firm performance might be more tangible.  Column (5) 
presents the results relating to how closely the board monitors the CEO.  This activity is 
marginally more diffused among the boards of listed firms (the effect is significant with 
confidence 0.90).  However, this difference goes progressively away as the stake of the 
largest shareholder increases.  The largest shareholder may prefer to monitor the CEO 
personally.  
Overall, we find evidence suggesting that, if there is an optimal governance model, it 
differs across listed and unlisted firms.  It seems that the mix of governance tools used by 
listed firms differs from that used by unlisted firms.   
As mentioned in Section 2, the preceding analysis assumes that listing is exogenous 
to the various governance dimensions.  As a robustness test, we drop that assumption and 
instrument listing status with the industry dummies bFINANCIAL and bHI-TECH.  A 
Stock-Yogo (2003) test rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments.  Firm size and the 
stake of the largest shareholder are included as controls.   
                                                 
20 Unless stated otherwise, statistical significance is with confidence 0.95. 
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For the specifications in the first two columns of the table we estimate a probit 
regression for listing status and follow Wooldridge's (2002) procedure 18.1 to estimate 
the parameters of our regression equations.  To estimate the specifications in columns 
(3)-(5), we use the ivprobit approach as implemented in Stata 10.  For all specifications, 
we drop all multiplicative terms.  The last two rows in the table show the resulting Wu-
Hausman F-test statistics for the first two specifications and chi-square values for a Wald 
test of exogeneity (as implemented in Stata 10) for the remaining three columns.  The 
tests are unable to reject exogeneity of listing status, which is why we report the simpler 
results.  The exception is the test for the case of board independence.  The coefficients 
implied by that analysis, however, are identical in sign and significance to the ones we 
report. 
 
8. Buildup of Takeover Defenses 
Control is generally contestable in listed firms, since any investor can buy stock.  In 
comparison, unlisted firms are less exposed to the threat of takeover because they are 
closely held and their shares are not traded on an organized exchange in the first place.  
The rationale for adopting takeover defenses could be managers’ attempt to avoid the 
discipline of capital markets and protect their on-the-job consumption.  These defenses, 
however, could also be justified on the basis of efficiency arguments.  They could, for 
example, increase firms’ bargaining power in takeover contests [DeAngelo and Rice 
(1983) and Stulz (1988)] or prevent managerial myopia [Stein (1988)].  In what follows, 
we test for differences in takeover defenses in listed and unlisted firms.  Daines and 
Klausner (2001) study a sample of firms that go public in 1994-1997 and find that 
antitakeover provisions are common in IPO-stage charters.  The need to boost bargaining 
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power and the threat of market myopia, however, cannot explain these provisions, and 
neither can managers’ desire to protect their privileges.   
Panel A of Table VII describes the frequency of three types of antitakeover 
mechanisms: voting restrictions, dual-class structures, and staggered boards.  In dual-
class structures, one class of stock is given more voting rights for the same par value.  
Interestingly, these mechanisms can be found in unlisted firms as well.  The most obvious 
explanation for their existence there is control arguments rather than bargaining or 
managerial myopia rationales.  Voting restrictions exist in about 30 percent of listed firms 
compared with roughly 10 percent of unlisted ones.  Dual-class structures are 
comparatively infrequent, although they are more prevalent in listed firms, too—12 
percent of listed firms compared with 5 percent of unlisted ones.  Finally, there is a slight 
difference in the frequency of staggered boards—26 and 22 percent in listed versus 
unlisted firms.  Note, that in Switzerland, unlike what happens in the U.S. [Bebchuk, 
Coates, and Subrahmanyan (2002)], it is not possible to install staggered boards in such a 
way that dismantling them would require shareholder and board approval. 
Panel B of the table estimates robust probit regressions to explain the cross-sectional 
variation of a given antitakeover device.  As in the case of Table VI, these regression 
specifications compare the reduced form of the hypothetical governance model in listed 
and unlisted firms.  Voting restrictions is the first antitakeover provision examined.  The 
regression fails to uncover a difference.  The higher frequency of this provision among 
listed firms observed in Panel A is therefore due to diverse average values of the 
exogenous variables in the two samples, in particular, the stake of the largest shareholder.  
The coefficient associated with that variable is negative and significant.  Since the stake 
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of the largest shareholder is smaller in listed firms, that could explain the higher 
incidence of voting restrictions in listed firms. 
The second antitakeover provision examined is dual-class structures, which we saw 
are more prevalent among listed firms.  The results indicate that the likelihood of dual-
class structures increases significantly with the stake of the largest shareholder in listed 
firms.  Control is easier to finance if the largest shareholder holds the stock with superior 
voting rights.  The third provision of interest is staggered boards.  We saw in the 
preceding table that this provision is equally common in either type of firm.  The 
regression analysis is unable to unearth any hidden cross-sample differences in the 
popularity of this mechanism.       
As in the preceding table, we examine the possible reverse causation between 
antitakeover devices and listing status.  It could be that firms with antitakeover 
mechanisms in place are more likely to list.  As in the preceding table, we instrument 
listing status with the industry dummies bFINANCIAL and bHI-TECH.  Firm size and 
the stake of the largest shareholder are included as controls.  We drop the multiplicative 
terms in the regression specification and estimate the regression parameters following the 
ivprobit approach as implemented in Stata 10.  The last row in the table shows the 
resulting chi-square values for a Wald test of exogeneity.  The test is unable to reject 
exogeneity of listing status at traditional levels of confidence.    
 
9. Firm performance 
To be attractive, listed firms eventually have to deliver their implicit promises of 
protection for minority investors in dollars and cents.  This section asks whether that is 
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the case.  To find out, we need performance data.  Unfortunately, as we have seen, 
unlisted firms disclose very little, least of all performance information.  The only data we 
have are sales from Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database, and only for a limited subset 
of firms.  Table VIII uses these data to compare the performance of listed and unlisted 
firms; performance is measured as the deviation of the firm’s sales growth from the 
industry median.  The years examined are 2003–2005 and 2004–2005.  The survey year 
is 2003.   
The regressions control for firm size, voting stake of the largest shareholder, and 
binary variables for the financial and the high-tech industry.  According to Table VIII, 
listed firms experience significantly faster industry-adjusted growth, especially if we 
focus on 2004–2005, the years past the survey year.  Looking at those years, the 
difference is larger than 10 percentage points, regardless whether we control for the stake 
of the largest shareholder.  None of the control variables has a significant coefficient.  
It is unclear, though, which way causality goes.  Does listing, with the increased 
scrutiny by the investment community it brings about, induce firms to perform better, or 
are better firms more likely to list?  To find out, we drop the multiplicative terms in the 
specification and repeat the analysis with an instrumental variable approach.  In that 
approach, we instrument listing status once again with the industry dummies 
bFINANCIAL and bHI-TECH.  Firm size and the stake of the largest shareholder are 
included as controls.  We then implement Wooldridge's (2002) procedure 18.1.  The 
resulting Wu-Hausman F-test statistic reported at the bottom of the table is unable to 
reject exogeneity of listing status at traditional levels of confidence.  Hence, there is no 
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reason to question the probit results we just discussed.  Based on this evidence, listing 
status induces companies to achieve superior performance. 
We also examine whether listed firms are more inclined to letting investors at large 
participate in their superior performance by distributing more generous cash dividends.  
Here too, we have only limited data.  What little information we do have is consistent 
with the proposition.  There are 101 firms in Switzerland that go public in the years 
2000–2006.  We have dividend data for 29 of these firms three years before the IPO and 
data for 81 of them three years thereafter.  Three years before the IPO, only 27 percent of 
the available firms pay dividends, compared with 42 percent three years thereafter.  The 
data are therefore consistent with the prediction that listed firms are true to their words 
and treat minority investors better.  Given the limited number of observations, however, 
this result needs confirming with additional data. 
           
10. Conclusions 
This paper compares corporate governance in listed and unlisted firms.  When unlisted 
firms go public, they have to attract investors at large, meaning that their main 
shareholders have to give up some control and guarantee investors against expropriation.  
To find out whether that happens, we examine the ownership structure and the disclosure 
policy of listed firms.  Also, we investigate whether listed companies design their board 
structures, choose board compositions, and set up board processes to attract minority 
shareholders.  We also inquire whether listed firms perform better, and whether they 
actually treat minority shareholders better.  
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The results indicate that listed firms disclose more information.  Their Web sites are 
more informative and they rely on accounting standards that are stricter than those 
required under the law.  Unlisted firms are very reluctant to reveal much of anything.   
Listed firms also assign real tasks and responsibilities to their boards (especially 
monitoring and replacement of management), let them meet more often, and fit them with 
committees.  Their boards are larger and directors are elected for a shorter term.  We also 
find that the way the boards of listed firms operate seems to respect the separation of 
powers, since: (a) they are substantially independent (and significantly more so than those 
of unlisted firms); (b) they closely monitor both the CEO (more closely than in unlisted 
firms); and (c) they assign the nomination of directors to fellow board members (and not 
to blockholders, as in unlisted firms).  There is also marginal evidence that the directors 
of listed firms are less frequently blockholders.  The instances of CEOs with a dual role 
as COBs are equally frequent, although listed firms have more often a lead director.   
Even though the overall evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that listed firms 
take better care of minority investors, it also suggests that the boards of unlisted firms are 
more than rubber-stamp institutions.  The boards of unlisted firms, for example are also 
fairly independent and bear significant responsibility for defining the firm’s strategy.   
Finally, listed companies seem to perform better, at least based on their industry-
adjusted sales growth.  They also follow up on their words and disburse more cash to 
shareholders at large.  This finding, however, is only tentative and needs corroboration.    
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Table I 
Descriptive statistics 
The table provides descriptive statistics for the total sample of firms as well as the subsamples of listed and 
unlisted firms.  Age is the number of years since incorporation.  Column (4) reports the statistics for mean-
comparison t-tests and median-comparison z-tests (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests).  The exception is the tests 
involving the number of firm employees, for which we report a likelihood-ratio chi-squared statistic.  
Column (5) shows the associated p-values for two-sided tests against zero.  The symbol *** indicates 
statistical significance in a two-sided test of difference from zero with confidence 0.99.  The data refer to 
Swiss firms in 2003.   
 
  Listed firms Unlisted firms Comparison 
test 
p-values 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Number of firms    86 185   
      
Median company age    49 57 0.123 (0.726) 
      
Firms with:     
fewer than 100 employees 6.98% 29.19%   
between 100 and 199 employees 3.49% 14.05%   
between 200 and 499 employees  9.30% 24.86%   
between 500 and 999 employees  15.12% 11.35%   
more than 1,000 employees 65.12% 20.54% 61.91*** (0.000) 
      
Share capital (millions of CHF)     
Average  230.28 18.76 –5.765*** (0.000) 
Median  48.95 2.50 44.857*** (0.000) 
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Table II 
Variable definitions 
 
bLISTED Binary variable equal to 1 if the company is listed, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
LNSIZE Natural logarithm of the company’s book value of equity; 
AGE Firm’s age in years; 
bHI-TECH 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to one of the following industries: 
chemical/pharmaceutical, medtech, technology/information systems, or 
telecommunication; the variable equals 0 otherwise; 
bFINANCIAL Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the financial industry (banking and insurance); the variable equals 0 otherwise; 
LARGESTVOTE Fraction of voting rights controlled by the largest shareholder. 
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Table III 
Distribution of votes 
 
The table shows the distribution of votes in the 271 sample firms by type of shareholder (largest 
shareholder, blockholders as a group, management, and board).  Blockholders control more than 5 percent 
of total votes.  Column (3) reports the statistics of mean-comparison t-tests and median-comparison z-tests 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum tests with Yates’ continuity correction).  Column (4) shows the associated p-values for 
two-sided tests against zero.  The data refer to Swiss firms as of the end of 2003.  
 
 
 Listed firms Unlisted firms Comparison test p-values 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Largest shareholder     
Number of firms 86 185   
Median 23.50% 70.00% 28.192*** (0.000) 
Fraction of votes ≥ 50% 33.72% 74.05% 40.079*** (0.000) 
     
Blockholders as a group     
Number of firms 77 174   
Median 45.00% 100.00% 84.310*** (0.000) 
Fraction of votes ≥ 50% 48.05% 94.25% 67.475*** (0.000) 
     
Management    
Number of firms 78 181   
Median 1.00% 0.00% 0.407 (0.523) 
Fraction of votes ≥ 50% 5.13% 28.18% 21.032*** (0.000) 
     
Board    
Number of firms 79 181   
Median 1.00% 75.00% 35.203*** (0.000) 
Fraction of votes ≥ 50% 16.46% 61.33% 47.682*** (0.000) 
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Table IV 
Information disclosed on corporate Web sites 
 
The table reports descriptive statistics concerning the information reported on corporate Web sites.  
Comparison test statistics are z-values from proportion tests.  The exception is the test involving the 
financial information that firms publish on their Web sites, for which we report the likelihood-ratio chi-
squared statistic.  p-values are for two-sided tests of difference from zero.  The symbol *** indicates 
statistical significance in a two-sided test against zero with confidence 0.99.  The data refer to Swiss firms 
in 2003. 
  
 
 
 Listed firms Unlisted 
firms 
Comparison 
test 
p-value 
     
Number of observations 86 185   
Number of firms with Web site 86 169   
Percentage of firms with Web site 100.0% 91.4% 2.81*** (0.005) 
     
Financial information:   107.611*** (0.000) 
   No financial information 4.65% 47.34%   
   Only last year’s sales 4.65% 15.38%   
   Only earnings or sales in recent years 1.16% 12.43%   
   Full balance sheet or income statement 89.53% 24.85%   
     
Corporate information:     
   Annual report 90.70% 25.44% 9.87*** (0.000) 
   Organizational chart 56.98% 23.67% 5.28*** (0.000) 
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Table V 
Board architecture, nominating authority, and board tasks 
 
The table compares the boards of directors of listed and unlisted firms.  Panel A reports differences in the 
architecture of the board.  Panel B examines what influence various parties have in the nomination of new 
directors.  Panel C looks for differences in board tasks, processes, and incentives.  The COBs rate the 
importance of each dimension listed in the table with scores between 1 and 4 (1 meaning lowest 
importance).  The second and third column in the table reports average scores for various dimensions of 
interest or proportions of firms with a given characteristic.  The fourth column shows the z-values for two-
sided Wilcoxon rank-sum or proportion tests of difference between listed and unlisted firms.  The 
associated p-values are shown in column 4.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The data refer to Swiss firms in 2003. 
 
Panel A: Board architecture 
 Listed firms Unlisted 
firms 
Comparison 
test 
p-value 
Actual board size (median) 6.00 5.00 5.41*** (0.000) 
Optimal board size (median) 6.00 5.00 6.12*** (0.000) 
Board independence (median) 0.8000 0.5000 5.96*** (0.000) 
Proportion of firms with:     
    board committees 0.8118 0.2444 8.72*** (0.000) 
    blockholder-directors 0.6057 0.7198 1.89* (0.059) 
    CEO-COB duality 0.1977 0.2757 –1.38 (0.168) 
    CEO-director duality 0.3953 0.5135 –1.81* (0.070) 
    lead directors in case of CEO-COB duality 0.7333 0.3673 2.49** (0.013) 
 
Panel B: Nominating authority 
 Listed firms Unlisted 
firms 
Comparison 
test 
p-value 
Board 3.6153 3.3497 1.90* (0.058) 
Blockholders 3.1831 3.6257 –4.29*** (0.000) 
CEO 2.5972 2.7958 –1.55 (0.122) 
Institutional investors 1.5593 1.1746 4.94*** (0.000) 
 
Panel C: Board tasks, processes, and incentives 
 Listed firms Unlisted 
firms 
Comparison 
test 
p-value 
Board processes     
    Board term (median years) 3 3 2.40** (0.017) 
    Annual number of board meetings 6 to 8 3 to 5 3.71*** (0.000) 
Board tasks     
    Strategy definition 3.7674 3.7680 0.24 (0.812) 
    Monitoring the financial situation 3.941 3.864 1.34 (0.812) 
    Appointing or dismissing managers 3.8571 3.5460 3.49*** (0.001) 
    Monitoring the CEO 3.7500 3.4740 2.31** (0.031) 
    Managing relations with key investors 2.052 1.590 2.11** (0.034) 
Board incentives     
    Variable board compensation (proportion) 0.1786 0.1421 0.77 (0.442) 
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Table VI 
The mechanics of the listing effect 
 
The table asks whether the corporate governance model of listed firms differs from that of unlisted ones.  Each column 
reports the estimated regression coefficient for one particular board dimension against determining factors and the 
associated robust z-values (in parentheses).  To account for the distributional properties of the dependent variables, 
specifications 1 and 2 are estimated with robust OLS regressions while columns 3 to 6 report the results from robust 
probit regressions.  Independent variable definitions are in Table II.  The last two rows of the table test for exogeneity 
of listing status, which we compute as follows.  For the specifications in the first two columns of the table 
we estimate a probit regression for listing status and follow Wooldridge’s (2002) procedure 18.1 to estimate 
the parameters of our regression equations.  To estimate the specifications in columns (3)-(5), we use the 
ivprobit approach as implemented in Stata 10.  In either case, we instrument listing status with the industry 
dummies bFINANCIAL and bHI-TECH.  Firm size and the stake of the largest shareholder are included as 
controls.  The last two rows in the table show the resulting Wu-Hausman F-test statistics for the first two 
specifications, and the chi-square values for a Wald test of exogeneity (as implemented in Stata 10) for the 
remaining three columns.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance in a two-sided test of 
difference from zero with confidence 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99, respectively.  The data refer to Swiss firms in 2003. 
 
 
 Board size Board in-
dependence 
Blockholder 
board 
representation 
Board’s 
variable 
compensation 
Board’s 
monitoring 
of the CEO 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
LNSIZE 0.566*** 0.022** 0.021 –0.135*** –0.054 
 (6.96) (2.33) (0.49) (–2.68) (–1.14) 
LARGESTVOTE –1.612*** –0.074 0.093 0.162 0.223 
 (–3.73) (–0.98) (0.29) (0.41) (0.75) 
bFINANCIAL 0.675 0.185*** –0.895*** –0.599 0.047 
 (1.61) (2.86) (–3.27) (–1.20) (0.15) 
bHITEC 0.020 –0.067 –0.062 0.280 –0.074 
 (0.06) (–1.04) (–0.21) (0.94) (–0.27) 
bLISTED –0.718 0.260*** –0.950** 0.547 0.718* 
 (–1.05) (3.47) (–2.50) (1.22) (1.80) 
bLISTED? LARGESTVOTE 1.884* –0.240** 1.415** –0.281 –1.066* 
 (1.90) (–2.25) (1.98) (–0.43) (–1.65) 
bLISTED? bFINANCIAL –0.437 –0.158 1.000** 1.411**  
 (–0.41) (–1.60) (1.97) (2.09)  
bLISTED? bHITEC –0.282 0.077 –0.029 –0.47 0.495 
 (–0.43) (0.96) (–0.07) (–0.94) (1.10) 
Constant 5.473*** 0.520*** 0.671*** –1.052*** 0.351 
 (15.63) (8.46) (2.65) (–3.43) (1.48) 
      
Number of observations 271 265 268 267 247 
F-Test resp. Chi-squared test 14.85*** 15.92*** 22.26*** 14.44* 6.84 
(pseudo) R2 35.34% 28.13% 7.16% 6.94% 2.33% 
Wu-Hausman F-Test 1.17 3.23*    
Wald test of exogeneity   2.41 0.04 0.22 
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Table VII 
Listing status and antitakeover protection 
The table compares the spread of antitakeover mechanisms in listed and unlisted firms.  We examine limits to the 
percentage of votes any individual shareholder can cast, staggered board provisions, and dual-class share structures.  
Panel A shows univariate results.  The test statistic that we report in the third column is the z-value from a two-sample 
test of proportion.  The associated p-value is reported in Column 4.  Each column in Panel B of the table reports the 
estimated coefficients from robust probit regressions of one particular antitakeover mechanism against determining 
factors and the associated robust z-values (in parentheses).  Independent variable definitions are in Table II.  The last 
row of the table reports chi-square values from a Wald test of exogeneity of listing status, which we compute following 
the ivprobit approach as implemented in Stata 10.  In doing so, we instrument listing status with the industry dummies 
bFINANCIAL and bHI-TECH.  Firm size and the stake of the largest shareholder are included as controls.  The 
symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance in a two-sided test of difference from zero with confidence 0.90, 
0.95, and 0.99, respectively.  The data refer to Swiss firms in 2003. 
 
Panel A: Frequencies of antitakeover protection mechanisms 
 
 Listed firms Unlisted 
firms 
Comparison 
test 
p-value 
     
Number of observations 85 177   
     
Percentage of firms with voting restrictions 0.2976 0.0960 4.14*** (0.000) 
Percentage of firms with dual-class structures 0.1190 0.0508 1.98** (0.059) 
Percentage of firms with staggered boards 0.2639 0.1946 1.17 (0.242) 
     
 
Panel B: Multivariate regressions 
 
 Voting restrictions Dual-class 
structures 
Staggered boards 
    
LNSIZE –0.061 0.049 0.034 
 (–1.14) (0.74) (0.66) 
LARGESTVOTE –1.803*** –0.156 0.021 
 (–3.95) (–0.41) (0.05) 
bFINANCIAL 0.732** –0.085 –0.016 
 (2.19) (–0.16) (–0.05) 
bHI-TECH –0.428 0.528 –0.396 
 (–0.76) (1.44) (–1.12) 
bLISTED 0.278 –0.837* 0.144 
 (0.65) (–1.80) (0.32) 
bLISTED? LARGESTVOTE 0.325 3.087*** –0.101 
 (0.46) (3.85) (–0.15) 
bLISTED? bFINANCIAL 0.023 0.384 0.474 
 (0.04) (0.52) (0.87) 
bLISTED? bHI-TECH 1.037 –1.435* –0.178 
 (1.57) (–1.86) (–0.32) 
Constant –0.419 –1.699*** –0.853*** 
 (–1.44) (–5.26) (–2.79) 
    
Number of observations 261 261 221 
F-Test /Chi-squared test 38.48*** 20.80*** 7.82 
pseudo R2 23.96% 17.42% 3.27% 
Wald test of exogeneity, Chi-squared value 2.25 0.01 2.54 
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Table VIII 
Listing status and firm performance 
 
The table investigates whether listed firms perform better than unlisted ones.  The analysis is conducted with OLS 
regression with robust standard errors.  Performance is measured alternatively as the average industry-adjusted rate of 
growth in sales during 2003–2005 (regressions 1 and 2) and 2004–2005 (regressions 3 and 4).  Rates of growth in sales 
are from Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database.  Numbers in parentheses are t-values.  Independent variable definitions 
are in Table II.  The last row of the table reports Wu-Hausman F-test statistics for a test of exogeneity of listing 
status, which we compute following Wooldridge’s (2002) procedure 18.1 to estimate the parameters of the 
regression equations.  In doing so, we instrument listing status with the industry dummies bFINANCIAL 
and bHI-TECH.  Firm size and the stake of the largest shareholder are included as controls.  The symbols *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance in a two-sided test of difference from zero with confidence 0.90, 0.95, and 
0.99, respectively.  The data refer to Swiss firms in 2003.The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance in 
a two-sided test against zero with confidence 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99, respectively.  The data refer to Swiss firms in 2003.   
 
 
 Industry-adjusted sales growth  2003–2005 
Industry-adjusted sales growth  
2004–2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
LNSIZE –0.005 –0.003 0.004 0.005 
 (–0.26) (–0.17) (0.45) (0.51) 
LARGESTVOTE  0.414  0.108 
  (1.43)  (1.15) 
bFINANCIAL 0.164 0.119 –0.032 –0.042 
 (0.81) (0.52) (–0.53) (–0.63) 
bHITEC 0.097 0.082 –0.033 –0.035 
 (0.48) (0.43) (–0.47) (–0.50) 
bLISTED 0.165* 0.321* 0.133*** 0.174** 
 (1.97) (1.82) (2.62) (2.49) 
Constant –0.056 –0.337 –0.110*** –0.187* 
 (–1.33) (–1.66) (–6.91) (–2.60) 
     
Number of observations 86 86 100 100 
F-Test 1.59 1.10 4.71*** 3.15** 
R2 2.90% 6.50% 6.85% 8.12% 
Wu-Hausman F-Test 0.54 0.01 0.07 0.05 
 
 
